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Abstract
This paper extends the literature on predatory short selling and bailouts
through a joint analysis of the two. We consider a model with informed short
sales, as well as uninformed predatory short sales, which can trigger the ineﬃcient
liquidation of a ﬁrm. We obtain several novel results: A government commitment
to bail out insolvent ﬁrms with positive probability can increase welfare because
it selectively deters predatory short selling without hampering desirable informed
short sales. Contrasting a common view, bailouts can be optimal ex ante but
undesirable ex post. Furthermore, bailouts in our model are a better policy tool
than short selling restrictions. Welfare gains from the bailout policy are unevenly
distributed: shareholders gain while taxpayers lose. Bailout taxes allow ex-ante
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper Miller (1977) shows that short selling is crucial for market efficiency.
If investors differ in their expectations, and short selling is not possible, prices do
not aggregate the views of pessimists and optimists because the latter end up trading
with themselves. In recent financial crises, this beneficial view of short sales has been
challenged. A purported strategy is to depress market prices though aggressive short
selling, hoping that this triggers a panic or value-destroying actions by the shorted
company. Concerned about this possibility of predatory short selling, regulators around
the world have temporarily banned short selling activities.1
Another policy instrument in recent crises was government bailouts. They came in
various forms such as capital injections, cheap credit or asset purchases above market
prices. One link between short selling and bailouts is that a firm that is put in distress
by short selling may ask for a bailout. This papers highlights another effect: an ex-ante
commitment to bailing out distressed firms with positive probability can make socially
harmful short selling strategies less attractive without hampering desired short sales.
Specifically, we study a firm that needs to refinance its debt in order to complete a
long-term investment project. A strategic trader either has superior negative informa-
tion about the project and thus conducts desirable informed short sales, or the trader
is uninformed but nevertheless considers a predatory short selling strategy. There is
also a continuum of rational but uninformed competitive financial investors. As these
investors cannot distinguish informed from uninformed short sales, the latter can be
wrongly interpreted as a signal for a bad firm. In such a case, inefficient liquidation of
an attractive project can lead to a decline in prices, which leaves the predatory short
seller with a profit.
In this context, a commitment of the government to bail out a distressed firm with a
positive probability can prevent predatory short sales while not reducing the frequency
of informed short sales. Due to this deterrence effect, a positive bailout probability can
increase the efficiency of financial markets as well as total welfare. A short sale ban, by
1The SEC, for example, motivated the 2008 short selling ban by stating: “Recent market conditions
have made us concerned that short selling in the securities of a wider range of financial institutions
may be causing sudden and excessive fluctuations of the prices of such securities in such a manner so
as to threaten fair and orderly markets” (SEC 2008, p. 1)
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contrast, would prevent both informed and uninformed short selling, and is therefore
inferior in the model that we study.
Our results are not only new because they shed light on the possible connections
between short selling and bailouts. They also add new aspects to the understanding of
bailouts.
First, we find a commitment problem that is opposite to the common commitment
problem in the literature. Starting with Thornton (1802)2 the literature highlights
undesired effects of bailout policies on risk taking, and outlines strategies for dealing
with the time inconsistency that can arise because a bailout may be welfare optimal
ex post, but not necessarily ex ante (e.g. Mailath and Mester 1994, Acharya and
Yorulmazer 2007, Farhi and Tirole, 2012, Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 2014, Chari
and Kehoe, 2013). In our model, the ex-ante effect of bailouts is positive because they
suppress predatory short sales. Ex post, the insolvency probability is so high that the
government would always prefer not to bail out the firm.
Our model abstracts from exogenous externalities of bailouts for the sake of a clear
exposition of the effects that are novel to the literature. Bailouts can have positive
externalities if they help avoid negative feedback effects between banks (e.g. modeled
in Philippon and Schnabl, 2011), improve creditor confidence (Cheng and Milbradt,
2012), or secure benefits that stakeholders derive from a continued existence of the
firm (Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 2014). On the other hand, funding the bailouts can
lead to costs in the form of tax-induced inefficiencies and higher sovereign credit risk
(Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 2014, Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2011).
Even though we abstract from such exogenous externalities of bailouts, Bagehot’s
dictum that only solvent firms with good collateral should be bailed out does not hold
in our model.3 If a welfare optimal bailout policy fully deters predatory short sales,
remaining short sales are always informed and a bailout after a short sale always rescues
an insolvent firm.
2“It is by no means intended to imply, that it would become the Bank of England to relieve every
distress which the rashness of country banks may bring upon them: the bank, by doing this, might
encourage their improvidence” (Thornton, 1802, p.188).
3“Advances should be made on all good banking securities” (Bagehot, 1873, ch. VII.II). An example
for a policy reference to this dictum is Bernanke’s (2008) statement on Lehman Brothers: “A public-
sector solution for Lehman proved infeasible, as the firm could not post sufficient collateral to provide
reasonable assurance that a loan from the Federal Reserve would be repaid.”
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As in Goldstein and Guembel (2008), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2014) and Liu
(2010), aggressive shorting can be profitable because it triggers inefficient actions by
the shorted company. These studies, which do not consider bailouts, find that short
selling restrictions can be welfare increasing. In our model, a bailout policy dominates
short sale restrictions because it selectively reduces predatory short sales while keeping
informed short sellers in the market. Consistent with these results and the intense use
of bailouts by governments, empirical studies on the financial crisis suggest that short
selling during the financial crisis did not have a strong destabilizing impact (Bailey
and Zheng, 2013) and that short sale restrictions largely failed to achieve the aim of
stabilizing prices (cf. Beber and Pagano, 2013, and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013).
Though much of the recent policy debate and many academic papers focus on finan-
cial institutions, we study a generic firm that could as well be an industrial or service
firm. Direct support of non-financial firms is common. Examples in the US include
loans to airlines in 2001, and to Chrysler and General Motors in 2008. International
datasets compiled by Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) and Smith (2012) contain
many bailouts of non-financial firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section introduces
the basic model. The third section discusses the effects and comparative statics of
bailouts and short sales. The fourth section studies further aspects. We first discuss
why a private commitment to refinance after a short sale is less efficient and credible
to deter predatory short sales than a bailout policy. We then discuss incorporation of
additional signals in the bailout decision and compare the bailout policy with a policy
that simply forbids short sales. The fifth section briefly concludes.
2 Interaction between investors and traders in the
absence of bailouts
This section develops and analyzes a basic model without bailouts. An overview of the
model´s variables is given in the appendix. In a nutshell, we study a firm that can be
a good or bad type, with all assets invested in a risky project. Majority shareholders
are small, risk-neutral competitive investors that do not know the firm’s type and must
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decide on premature liquidation of the project. There is a strategic trader, who learns
with positive probability the firm’s type and can trade in the stock market before the
liquidation decision. In equilibrium, short sales are a noisy, informative signal about a
bad firm type and can thus trigger liquidation. In a predatory short sale, the trader
has no information that the firm is a bad type but still benefits due to the triggered
liquidation.
2.1 Firm and investment project
There is a firm that has its entire assets invested in a risky project. The time line of
the model is characterized by three dates t1, t2 and t3 as illustrated in Figure 1.
t1
nature draws
firm’s type θ
strategic trader
learns θ with
probability η
t2
firm refinances
debt or
liquidates project
t3
project realizes
(if refinanced)
strategic trader
trades in
firm’s shares
Figure 1: Time line of the model without bailouts
At t1 nature draws the firm’s type θ, which can be good, θ = g, or bad, θ = b. The
probability of a good type is given by
Pr(θ = g) = γ. (1)
The type determines the success probability σθ of the firm’s investment project, with
σg > σb. We denote by
σu = γσg + (1− γ)σb (2)
the expected success probability given that the firm’s type is unknown. The the
project’s payoff realizes at t3.
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The resulting valuation of the firm’s assets is given byv if the project is successful,0 if the project fails. (3)
The firm is financed with equity and debt. Without loss of generality we normalize
the number of publicly traded stocks to 1. The firm must repay its debt in t2. The
repayment amount (including interest) is ∆. We assume that the firm refinances its debt
by raising ∆ dollar of new short term debt maturing at t3. We denote by i the interest
rate of this new debt. If the firm fails to refinance its debt, it cannot continue the
risky project, which will then be prematurely liquidated. Liquidation shall yield a fixed
liquidation value of L, which is independent of the firm’s type. The decision to liquidate
a firm shall be endogenously made by the shareholders in our model. Consequently, we
assume that the liquidation value is high enough to pay back current creditors: L > ∆.
Otherwise, the details of the country’s bankruptcy laws would be crucial for modeling
the liquidation decision, e.g. if L < ∆ bankruptcy laws may have required liquidation
already before t2. The shareholders’ payoff in case of early liquidation is given by
L−∆ > 0. (4)
We assume that it is socially efficient to liquidate a bad firm, i.e.
σbv < L. (5)
This condition will make informed short sales that trigger liquidation of a bad firm
type beneficial from a welfare perspective. On the other hand, it shall be efficient to
refinance a firm whose type is unknown
L < σuv. (6)
This condition has the effect that a predatory short sale, which triggers liquidation
even though the firm type is unknown, will reduce welfare.
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2.2 Shareholders’ decision to liquidate or refinance
There is a competitive fringe of risk-neutral passive small investors. Some investors own
the majority of the firm’s stocks and others can refinance the firm’s debt by buying
bonds at t2. Outside investment opportunities pay a risk-less interest rate of zero. In
addition, there is a risk-neutral strategic trader, who is possibly informed about the
firm’s type and can trade the firm’s stocks before t2. The details of the trading model
are relegated to the next subsection. Trading activities are observed by the passive
investors, who will rationally update their beliefs about the firm’s type.
We denote by σ˜ the passive shareholders’ and bond investors’ beliefs at date t2 about
the success probability of the firm’s project. The interest rate i received for the bond is
implicitly determined by the condition that expected returns are zero for a competitive
bond investor
σ˜ (1 + i) = 1. (7)
We assume that passive shareholders hold the majority of the firm’s stocks and decide
in t2 whether the project shall be liquidated or not. If the project is not liquidated,
shareholders expect a payoff of
σ˜(v −∆(1 + i)) = σ˜v −∆. (8)
The shareholders strictly prefer liquidation over refinancing if and only if
L−∆ > σ˜v −∆. (9)
This condition is equivalent to the simple condition that liquidation proceeds are larger
than the expected value of the project
L > σ˜v. (10)
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2.3 Strategic Trader
The strategic trader initially holds no shares of the firm. At time t1 the firm’s type
(good or bad) is revealed to the strategic trader with a revelation probability η. With
the complementary probability 1 − η the trader has no better information than any
competitive investor. Between t1 and t2, the strategic trader can trade the firm’s shares
in the market.
We describe trade activities in the stock market with a reduced form model.4 The
strategic trader will be able to profit from an informational advantage over competitive
investors. Yet, competitive investors do observe trade activities and use those stock
market signals to rationally update their beliefs about the firm’s type.
Formally, the strategic trader chooses a trading strategy τ ∈ {s, 0, `} where τ = s
indicates that a fixed amount of stocks is sold (short position), τ = ` that a fixed
amount is bought (long position) and τ = 0 means that no trades take place.5
At time t2 competitive investors have observed the trading strategy τ and rationally
form their beliefs σ˜ about the firm’s type and the corresponding expected returns of
loans given to the firm. We denote by pt the stock price at time t. The stock price p2
will be given by the firm’s valuation from the perspective of a competitive investor as:6
p2(σ˜) = max{σ˜v −∆, L−∆}. (11)
The stock price p1 in the first period will depend on the probabilities with which a
good or bad firm, respectively, will be liquidated in equilibrium:
p1 = (1− γ)(λbL+ (1− λb)σbv) + γ(λgL+ (1− λg)σgv)−∆, (12)
where λθ denotes the equilibrium probability with which a firm of type θ will be liqui-
dated. The price that the strategic trader pays, if τ = `, or receives, if τ = s, between
4The model reflects essential features of dynamic models of market micro structure like Kyle (1985).
We do not explicitly model the counterparties of the trade. There can be noise traders with liquidity
needs, or as in Kyle, market makers that cannot perfectly distinguish between uninformed noise traders
and informed traders.
5A discrete action space allows to avoid uninteresting technicalities in the game theoretic analysis
that would otherwise arise from equilibrium refinements in our signaling game between strategic trader
and passive investors and from characterizing mixed strategies on a continuous action space.
6Recall that we normalized the amount of stocks to one.
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t1 and t2 shall be given by
pτ = αp1 + (1− α)p2(σ˜(τ)). (13)
The parameter α ∈ (0, 1/2) measures the trader’s order management ability in the
market. If α = 0 the trader lacks all ability and will not be able to buy below or sell
above the resulting price level p2. For α = 1/2, the trader achieves the mean of p1 and
p2 as average price. The assumption α < 1/2 implies that the trader could not make
profits from a scheme in which he first sells stocks short (pushing down the price) and
afterward buys them back (pushing up the price back to the initial level).
2.4 Equilibrium behavior
An informed strategic trader will act on his superior information. Intuitively, he buys
shares when the good type is revealed and sells shares if the firm is a bad type. Thus the
uninformed investors rationally reduce their belief σ˜ about the firm’s success probability
when they observe a short sale. This also means the firm’s interest rate i for refinancing
its debt goes up after a short sale. As a consequence, a short sale can induce uninformed
shareholders to prematurely liquidate the project instead of refinancing it.
A premature liquidation causes the stock price to drop to L−∆, a level below the
initial price p1. This price drop is independent of the actual type of the firm. If the
likelihood of premature liquidation is sufficiently high, short sales are profitable for an
uninformed strategic trader who has no information that the project is bad. We call
such short sales (socially inefficient) predatory short sales. One can think of uninformed
strategic traders who perform predatory short sales to free-ride on the fact that passive
investors cannot distinguish between informed and predatory short sales.
We will now formally develop these results. To exclude equilibria that are sus-
tained by counter-intuitive out-of-equilibrium beliefs of passive investors, we make the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. (Out-off equilibrium beliefs) Consider an equilibrium in which the
probability that the strategic trader buys (short sells) shares is 0. Then the out-off
equilibrium event that the strategic trader buys (short sells) shares should neither
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1. reduce passive investors’ belief that the trader was informed and knows that the
firm type is good (bad), nor
2. increase passive investors’ belief that the trader was informed and knows that the
firm type is bad (good).Our first result is
Lemma 1. In every equilibrium the initial share price satisfies
p1 ≥ σuv −∆. (14)
Proof. The risk-neutral passive investors who hold shares and make the liquidation
decision in t2 have a simple strategy that guarantees them an expected final payoff of
σuv −∆: they just never liquidate.
Lemma 1 is straightforward and holds since passive investors are perfectly rational
and know the equilibrium strategies of the strategic trader. Therefore they cannot be
systematically fooled into a liquidation strategy that leads to a lower expected value
than the strategy to simply never liquidate the project.
The next result establishes that an informed trader who knows that the firm is a
bad type will always perform short sales.
Lemma 2. In every equilibrium an informed trader always performs short sales τ = s
if the revealed firm type is bad θ = b.
Proof. If an informed trader who knows that the firm type is bad does not trade he
makes zero profits and if he buys stocks, it follows from Lemma 1 that he makes losses in
expectation. We now show that in every equilibrium an informed trader can guarantee
strictly positive expected profits by short selling shares. A short sale is profitable if the
expected resulting share price is below p1. If the short sale leads to liquidation, the
share price drops from p1 ≥ σuv − ∆ to p2 = L − ∆ < σuv − ∆, which renders the
short sale profitable. Alternatively, there is no liquidation after the short sale. For the
informed trader the expected resulting stock price in t3 is then given by
σb(v − (1 + i)∆). (15)
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The interest rate i depends on passive shareholders’ beliefs σ˜ about the success proba-
bility
1 + i = 1/σ˜. (16)
To show that expected final share price will drop after a short sale, we must distinguish
different cases.
i) Consider an equilibrium, in which short sales are only performed by an informed
trader who knows that the firm is a bad type. Then a short sale reveals to passive
investors that the firm is a bad type, such that σ˜ = σb. Expected stock price in t3 then
simplifies to σbv −∆, which is strictly below the original price p1.
ii) Consider an equilibrium, in which on the equilibrium path short sales take place
with zero probability. Assumption 1 then guarantees that after an out-off-equilibrium
short sale passive investors hold beliefs that satisfy σ˜ ≤ σu. This guarantees that a
short sale will be profitable for the informed trader, since (15) satisfies
σb(v − (1 + i)∆) ≤ σb(v − 1
σu
∆) ≤ σuv −∆ < p1. (17)
iii) Consider an equilibrium in which on the equilibrium path an uninformed strate-
gic trader or an informed trader who knows that the firm type is good perform short
sales with positive probability. These trader types must make non-negative expected
profits from a short sale since they can reach a zero payoff by simply not trading. If a
short sale always leads to liquidation, the short sale is always profitable, as pointed out
above. If there is a positive probability that a short sale does not lead to liquidation,
the expected final stock price is strictly lower for the informed trader who knows that
the firm type is bad than for an uninformed strategic trader who performs short sales;
hence the informed strategic trader must make strictly positive expected profits from
the short sale in this case.
Non-surprisingly, an informed trader who knows that the firm type is good benefits
from buying the firm’s shares. However, it might even become profitable for an informed
trader who knows that the firm is a good type to perform a short sale if that short
sale triggers a liquidation with sufficiently high probability. There will never be an
equilibrium in which a trader who knows that the firm is good always performs short
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sales, since then short sales would not be informative anymore and no liquidation would
ever take place. Yet, in certain parameter ranges, we could have a mixed strategy
equilibrium in which such a trader mixes between buying the stock and short selling it.
To avoid tedious and uninteresting case distinctions, we will rule out this case in the
subsequent analysis.
Assumption 2. We restrict attention to cases in which an informed trader who knows
that the firm is a good type always buys shares in equilibrium.
Given this behavior of the strategic trader, it will never be rational for competitive
investors to liquidate the project if no short sales are observed. But since short sales
become an informative signal for a bad firm type, liquidation after short sales can
become rational for the shareholders. Let q be the probability that an uninformed
trader performs a predatory short sale (we allow for mixed strategies). The higher the
probability of predatory short sales q, the less likely it is that an observed short sale
was conducted by an informed trader and the less likely is a bad firm type; thus, the
less inclined will shareholders be to liquidate. We find the following result.
Lemma 3. For passive investors it will be (weakly) profitable to liquidate the project
after having observed short sales if and only if the probability q that uninformed traders
perform predatory short sales is (weakly) below a critical level
q¯ ≡ (1− γ) η
(1− η)
(L− σbv)
(σuv − L) > 0. (18)
Proof. Let q be the probability that an uninformed strategic trader performs predatory
short sales. A predatory short sale then happens with probability (1 − η)q while an
informed short sale happens with probability (1− γ)η. Hence, after observing a short-
sale passive investors’ rational beliefs about the project’s success probability are given
by
σ˜(s|q) = (1− η)qσu + (1− γ)ησb
(1− η)q + (1− γ)η . (19)
Passive shareholders will weakly prefer liquidation after short sales if and only if σ˜(s|q)v ≤
L, which is equivalent to
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q ≤ q¯ ≡ (1− γ) η
(1− η)
(L− σbv)
(σuv − L) . (20)
If q¯ > 1 the shareholders will always prefer to liquidate the behavior after a short
sale, independent of the frequency of short sales by an uninformed strategic trader. We
will restrict attention to this case in our subsequent analysis.
Assumption 3. Henceforth, we assume q¯ > 1, i.e. after short sales passive sharehold-
ers always prefer to liquidate the project.
Given that short sales always trigger liquidation after a short sale the share price
drops to
p2(s) = L−∆ < σuv −∆ < p1 (21)
and the predatory short seller always benefits from the short sale. We thus find for our
basic model without bailouts the following result:
Proposition 1. Absent bailouts and given q¯ > 1 an uninformed strategic trader will
always perform a predatory short sale, and every short sale triggers a liquidation of the
project.
3 Bailouts and short sales
3.1 Overview of bailouts
We now study the effects of a bailout policy on the prevalence of predatory and informed
short sales and on total welfare. We consider bailouts of the following form: in case
that refinancing conditions for a firm are so expensive that it chooses to liquidate the
project, the government can offer a cheaper loan that prevents this liquidation (debt
bailout). In this section, we assume that the government has the same information as
passive investors, i.e. it has no superior information about the firm’s type.
We consider bailouts in which the government pays not more for the bailout than
is necessary to prevent liquidation. This means the bailout loan is given at an interest
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rate i∗ such that the shareholders are indifferent between refinancing and liquidating,
i.e.
σ˜(s)(v −∆(1 + i∗)) = L−∆. (22)
As will become evident from the analysis below, i∗ is the lowest interest rate that still
guarantees that an informed short seller will not be harmed by a bailout.
We assume that the government can commit ex ante to a bailout policy that triggers
a bailout with a fixed probability β ∈ [0, 1] if absent bailouts the project were liquidated.
The assumption that bailouts are decided purely randomly allows us to cleanly show
how a positive bailout probability can be efficient, even absent any superior information
by the government. In Section 4, we will discuss the case in which the government
receives a private signal about the firm’s type before the bailout decision. Instead of
randomizing, it will then be optimal to perform bailouts for those firms whose signal
indicates a higher likelihood of a good project.
The key reason why such bailouts can act as a screening device that selectively deter
predatory short sales is that they affect expected profits of informed and uninformed
short sellers in a different direction. An informed short seller knows that the firm is a
bad type for which liquidation would be efficient. By preventing the efficient liquidation,
the bailout even reduces resulting share prices. In contrast, given the lack of information
of an predatory short seller, the expected firm value after the bailout is larger than its
liquidation value. Therefore, by preventing an inefficient liquidation a bailout reduces
profits of a predatory short seller.
3.2 Ex-post effect of bailouts
Consider the situation that after a short sale, a bailout is decided in t2. While passive
investors and the government believe the success probability of the firm to be σ˜(s),
an informed short seller knows that the success probability is σb and an uninformed
predatory short seller knows that the expected success probability is σu. Since an
informed trader performs a short sale if and only if he knows that the firm is a bad
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type, we have
σb ≤ σ˜(s) < σu. (23)
For the subsequent analysis, we use the index κ ∈ {u, b} to denote a short seller’s
type, characterized by his knowledge about the firm: we have κ = u for an uninformed
predatory short seller and κ = b for an informed short seller. After a bailout has been
decided in t2, a short seller of type κ has the following expectation about the resulting
share price in p3:
p¯3(κ) = σκ(v − (1 + i∗)∆)
=
σκ
σ˜(s)
(L−∆). (24)
where we find the second line by plugging in condition (22) for the bailout interest rate
i∗. Using this condition and (23), we also find
p¯3(b) ≤ L−∆ < p¯3(u). (25)
This means a bailout weakly benefits an informed short seller, since expected resulting
share prices in t3 fall below the share price under liquidation. Given that the success
probability is σb, a bailout lets a bad firm survive for one period longer and thereby
destroys shareholders’ value compared to an immediate liquidation. On the other hand,
a bailout reduces profits, possibly leading to losses, for an uninformed predatory short
seller, since, given his knowledge, the bailout raises expected share prices above the
share price under liquidation. We summarize this result in
Lemma 4. Ceteris paribus, a bailout in period 2 weakly increases the expected profits of
an informed short seller, but strictly reduces expected profits of an uninformed predatory
short seller.
Proof. See derivation above.
3.3 Bailout policy that deters predatory short sales
We now study how a commitment to a bailout probability β affects ex-ante profits and
equilibrium behavior of short sellers. A short seller’s ex-ante expected profit per share
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is given by
p¯iκ(β) = ps(β)− (βp¯3(κ)) + (1− β)(L−∆)) (26)
where ps(β) is the share price he receives in his short sales between period 1 and 2
and the term in brackets is the expected price at which he can buy back the shares.
Since we assumed that q¯ > 1, passive shareholders always want to liquidate the project
after they observe short sales. If a bailout takes place, the interest rate i∗ makes these
shareholders indifferent between liquidating or not, i.e. independent of a bailout taking
place or not, the share price in period 2 after a short sale is p2(s) = L − ∆. A short
seller thus gets the following average price when selling her shares between period 1
and 2
ps(β) = αp1(β) + (1− α)(L−∆). (27)
The initial share price is given by the expected value of the finally resulting share price
p1(β) = (1− η) · (1− q(β)) · (σuv −∆) + (uninformed trader who does not trade)
(1− η) · q(β) · (L−∆) + (predatory short sale)
η · (1− γ) · (L−∆) + (informed short sale)
η · γ · (σgv −∆) , (informed trader goes long)
(28)
where q(β) shall denote the equilibrium probability with which an uninformed trader
performs a predatory short sale. Note that the bailout probability β affects the initial
share price only by its effect on the frequency q(β) of predatory short sales. There
is no direct effect of β on the initial share price, because after a short sale passive
shareholders are indifferent between a bailout or not.
An explicit characterization of q(β) and the implied share prices, profits and welfare
for all β turns out to be fairly complex and becomes quickly intractable. We therefore
restrict attention to characterizing a minimal bailout probability β¯ that fully deters
predatory short sales and we will compare such a deterrence policy with a no bailout
policy.
We first note some preliminary results.
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Lemma 5. Consider an exogenous decrease in the frequency of predatory short sales q
(keeping the bailout probability β and everything else constant). Then expected profits
p¯iκ of both informed and predatory short sellers increase.
Proof. Follows directly from the equations above. In particular, we see from (28) ob-
serve that the initial share price p1 is decreasing in q.
The intuition why expected profits of short sellers go up if the frequency of predatory
short sales goes down is simple. A reduction of predatory short sales increases the initial
firm value p1, since fewer inefficient liquidations take place. This allows short sellers to
sell the shares at a higher price. Furthermore, the expected price at which they have
to buy back the shares is unaffected by the probability of short sales.
For the bailout probability β, we find
Lemma 6. An increase in the bailout probability β (weakly) reduces the frequency q(β)
of predatory short sales and the expected profits p¯iu(β) of predatory short sales and
(weakly) increases the expected profits p¯ib(β) of informed short-sellers.
Proof. Follows directly from the arguments leading to Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
In an equilibrium in which predatory short sales are fully deterred, the initial share
price will be given by
pd1 = (1− η) · (σuv −∆) + (uninformed trader who does not trade)
η · (1− γ) · (L−∆) + (informed short sale)
η · γ · (σgv −∆). (informed trader goes long)
(29)
The minimal bailout probability β¯ required to deter predatory short sales will depend
in a simple fashion on two markups. First, we have the relative markup of the initial
share price compared to the period 2 price after a short sale:
m12 =
pd1 − p2(s)
p2(s)
=
pd1 − (L−∆)
L−∆ (30)
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A higher markup m12, will make short sales more profitable and therefore requires a
higher bailout probability to deter predatory short sales. Second, we have the relative
markup of a predatory short seller’s expected period 3 price over the expected period
3 price of an informed short seller given a bailout:
mub =
p¯3(u)− p¯3(b)
p¯3(b)
=
σu − σb
σb
(31)
Intuitively, a higher markup mub means that a predatory short seller loses more
money when he has to buy back the shares in period 3 after a bailout; the required
bailout probability to deter predatory short sales will then be lower.
Proposition 2. If the government commits to a bailout probability weakly above the
critical level of
β¯ = α
m12
mub
(32)
then in every equilibrium predatory short sales are fully deterred while the frequency of
informed short sales is not affected by the bailout policy. For any bailout probability
below β¯ predatory short sales occur with positive probability in equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that for a given bailout probability β all predatory short sales are de-
terred, i.e. no uninformed trader performs a short sale. We analyze for which β unin-
formed traders make indeed no positive profits from a deviation to a predatory short
sale. Straightforward algebra shows that the expected resulting share price at which
an uninformed short-seller must buy back the shares can be written as
βp¯3(u) + (1− β)(L−∆) = β(σu
σb
(L−∆)) + (1− β)(L−∆))
= (1 + βmub)(L−∆) (33)
A predatory short seller’s ex-ante expected profits per share, given that no predatory
short sales take place in equilibrium, can then be written as
pidu =
[
αpd1 + (1− α)(L−∆)
]− (1 + βmub)(L−∆)
= αpd1 − (α + βmub)(L−∆) (34)
18
We see that these deviation profits are strictly decreasing in he bailout probability β.
Setting pidu equal to zero and solving for β, yields the critical bailout probability of
β¯ = α(
pd1 − (L−∆)
L−∆ )/mub = α
m12
mub
. (35)
It follows from the monotonicity results in Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 that for β > β¯
predatory short sales are deterred in all equilibria, while for β < β¯ there can be no
equilibrium in which predatory short sales are fully deterred.
Note that it is not always possible to fully deter predatory short sales with a positive
bailout probability, since in certain parameter constellations, we can have β¯ > 1. On
the other hand, it is evident that for sufficiently small ability in order management α,
it is always possible to deter predatory short sales. The following result summarizes
the comparative statics of the critical bailout probability.
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus, the minimal bailout probability β¯ to fully deter preda-
tory short sales is decreasing in the liquidation value L and increasing in the trader’s
ability of order management α, the probability γ that the firm is a good type and the
probability η that the strategic trader is informed.
Proof. Since α does not affect m12 and mub, we simply have
∂β¯
∂α
= m12
mub
> 0. The
parameters γ and η only affect the critical bailout probability β¯ via their effect on the
initial share price pd1 absent predatory short sales, which satisfies ∂β¯/∂p
d
1 > 0. As can
be easily verified from (29), this initial share price increases for a higher probability γ
that the firm is good or a higher probability η that the informed trader is informed:
∂pd1/∂γ > 0 and ∂p
d
1/∂η > 0. That ∂β¯/∂L < 0, follows from the fact that the markup
m12 is decreasing in the liquidation value L. This can be most cleanly seen by rewriting
m12 =
pd1 − (L−∆)
L−∆
=
(1− η) · (σuv −∆) + η · γ · (σgv −∆)
L−∆ − (1− η · (1− γ)) (36)
and noting that the first term is positive and thus strictly decreasing in L.
19
3.4 Welfare
While predatory short sales can be fully deterred by a bailout probability of β¯, it is
not obvious whether such a bailout policy is desirable from a welfare perspective. This
section analyses the welfare effects of such a bailout policy. For a clean exposition, we
want to abstract from shadow costs of government funds, which would make bailouts
less attractive, and from exogenous positive externalities of bailouts, which would make
them more attractive. Neither shall the distribution of expected payoffs among traders,
passive shareholders, creditors and taxpayers affect our welfare measure. Consequently,
we use the expected total payoff of the firm’s project (accounting for the possibility of
early liquidation) as welfare measure.
The welfare effect from changing a no-bailout policy to a bailout probability of β¯,
which fully deters predatory short sales, is given as follows:
W d −W 0 = −β¯η(1− γ)(L− σbv) (I)
+ (1− η)(σuv − L) (II)
The first term (I) describes the classical negative effect of the bailouts: prevention
of efficient liquidation. Absent bailouts, informative short sales, which happen with
probability (1 − γ)η, trigger efficient liquidation of a bad project. A bailout prevents
this efficient liquidation, which causes a welfare loss of L− σbv.
The second term (II) describes the positive welfare effect of (ex-ante) deterrence of
predatory short sales. Under a no-bailout policy, a predatory short sale takes place with
probability (1−η) and the resulting inefficient liquidation yields an expected welfare loss
of σuv −L. This inefficiency is fully removed by a bailout policy that deters predatory
short sales.
Comparing the negative and positive effect, we can establish the following result:
Proposition 4. There exists a critical ability in order management α¯ > 0 such that
for all α < α¯ a fully deterring predatory short sales with a commitment to a bailout
probability β¯ strictly increases welfare compared to a no bailout policy.
Proof. If α goes to zero, the critical bailout probability β¯ needed to fully deter predatory
short sales also goes to zero. This means also the negative welfare effect that predatory
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short sales prevent efficient liquidation goes to zero. In comparison, the positive effect
from deterring predatory short sales is independent of α. This means for sufficiently
small α the positive effect outweighs the negative effect.
3.5 Distribution of the welfare gains
3.5.1 Taxpayers lose, shareholders gain
The following result shows the distribution of welfare gains and welfare losses when the
government commits to a bailout probability of β compared to the absence of bailouts.
Proposition 5. Assume in an initial period the government moves from a no-bailout
policy to a welfare improving commitment to bailout with probability β¯. This policy
change leaves expected profits of the firm’s creditors unaffected. It causes expected losses
for the government, and shareholders make a gain equal to the sum of the total welfare
gain and the absolute value of the government’s losses.
Proof. We first note that creditors are in our model not affected by the bailout proba-
bility. The existing creditors get their loan repaid no matter whether there is a bailout
or liquidation. If new creditors refinance loans at t1 they always make zero expected
profits and are therefore also indifferent.
Under a bailout probability β¯ only informative short sales exist and thus any bailed-
out firm will have a bad project. Hence, given the government charges the highest
interest rate i∗ that makes shareholders accept the bailout instead of liquidating, the
government loses in expectation L − σbv in a bailout and ex-ante expected losses are
(1− γ)ηβ¯(L− σbv).
If there are no bailouts, we can rewrite equation (28) such that the initial stock
market value of the firm (given q¯ ≥ 1) is given by the following expected final payoff to
the shareholders:
p1(β = 0) = σuv −∆ + (1− γ)η(L− σbv)− (1− η)(σuv − L). (37)
The first term σuv−∆ is the expected payoff to the shareholders if there is no strategic
trading and hence no liquidation. The second term (1 − γ)η(L − σbv) is the expected
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positive impact of informed short sales that cause efficient premature liquidation. The
last term is the expected welfare loss due to inefficient liquidation triggered by predatory
short sales.
If the government commits to a bailout probability β¯, the losses −(1− η)(σuv −L)
from predatory short sales vanish. Since a bailout takes place at the interest rate i∗
that makes shareholders indifferent between accepting the bailout or liquidating, the
initial stock market value of the firm simply becomes
σuv −∆ + (1− γ)η(L− σbv). (38)
This means even though some of the bad projects after a short sale are bailed out
instead of being liquidated, the shareholders have the same expected profits, as if there
was always liquidation after an informed short sale. The expected ex-post inefficiencies
from the bailouts (1− γ)ηβ(L− σbv) are solely borne by the government.
If predatory short sales are fully deterred, only bad firms will be bailed out and the
government will always make losses from its bailouts: The expected value of a bailed-out
firm is just σbv, which is below the liquidation value L. Since the highest interest rate
i∗ at which shareholders accept the bailout makes them indifferent between liquidation
or not, these ex-post welfare losses of the bailout are fully borne by the government.
In contrast, the ex-ante welfare gains from the new bailout policy are fully captured
by the shareholders: the initial equity value (p1) increases since there is no more inef-
ficient premature liquidation caused by predatory short sales. The shareholders’ value
increases by the total welfare gain plus the absolute value of the expected ex-post losses
from bailouts borne by the government.
Given that shareholders gain more than the total welfare increase from a commit-
ment to a positive bailout probability, there is scope for redistribution to achieve Pareto-
improvements among taxpayers and shareholders without hurting creditors. Two policy
instruments for this task are forced bailouts and bailout taxes for shareholders.
Corollary 1. Consider the case that a commitment to a bailout probability β¯ increases
total welfare compared to a no-bailout policies. Shareholders still benefit from such a
policy change if the government in addition either
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1. decides that shareholders will be forced to accept government bailouts at the interest
rate at which the government makes zero losses, even though the shareholders
would have preferred to liquidate the project, or
2. imposes an ex-ante bailout tax on the firms such that the government’s expected
losses from bailouts are covered.
Similar policy instruments are indeed discussed and applied for banks. Forced recap-
italizations of banks were discussed and de facto imposed by several countries during
the financial crisis. In the European Union a common resolution fund for insolvent
banks is planned for 2016. It will be financed by a bank levy, which can be considered
as a form of bailout tax.
3.5.2 Bailouts make informed short sales more profitable
Uninformed strategic traders lose their profits from predatory short sales when the
government commits to a bailout probability of β¯. Yet, if it is welfare optimal to
deter predatory short sales, informed short sales will become more profitable if the
government commits to a bailout probability β¯. That is for two reasons. First, given β¯,
short sales reveal a bad firm type. Therefore bailouts after a short sale do not increase
the resulting stock price of a firm but reduces it from the value L−∆ under liquidation
to an expected value of σbv − ∆. This reduction benefits an informed short seller.
Second, if it is welfare optimal to bail out with probability β¯, the firm’s ex-ante value
and stock price p1 increase when implementing β¯. Hence, the informed short seller gets
a higher price when originally selling the shares. Both effects increase expected profits
of an informed short seller. We summarize these observations in
Corollary 2. Changing a zero bailout probability to β¯ increases expected profits of
informed short sales (while predatory short sales become unprofitable).
While not formally modeled in our framework, this suggests that strategic traders
would have more incentives to spend money to investigate whether a firm has a bad
type. This could be another channel how a higher bailout probability increases the
informational efficiency of short sales in financial markets.
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4 Discussion and Extensions
4.1 Commitment of shareholders to refinance after a short sale
Similar to a commitment strategy noted in Goldstein and Guembel (2008), a firm could
also deter predatory short sales if it could commit itself to refinance the project after
a short sale at the market interest rate with positive probability. One could therefore
question the need for government intervention. We focus on bailouts for the following
two reasons.
Compared to a bailout at interest rate i∗ the expected share price after private
refinancing at the market interest rate i is lower by σu(i− i∗)∆. The larger is the debt
level ∆, the larger is the excess cost of private refinancing over a bailout. Hence, from
the perspective of a predatory short seller, private refinancing is less harmful than a
bailout because it does not increase the expected period 3 share price by as much. To
prevent predatory short sales, the probability to privately refinance after a short sale
would have to be strictly above the critical bailout probability β¯. Since refinancing
after a short sale is ex-post inefficient, a commitment to privately refinance the project
is thus less efficient from a social perspective than an optimal bailout policy.
Second, the credibility of a private commitment to refinance after a short sale is
an issue. While credibility could arise from repeated interactions, a single firm may
not expect to be a repeated target of predatory short sales. Building up reputation
for refinancing may therefore not be very valuable for a single firm. In contrast, the
government may have much stronger incentives to build up reputation. Since many
firms could potentially be the target of predatory short sales, the continuation game is
much more relevant. More importantly, positive externalities from bailouts may weaken
or even reverse the commitment problem for the government. We discuss this point in
the next subsection.
4.2 The reversed commitment problem of the government
A common theme in the literature on bailouts is the following time-inconsistency prob-
lem: In good times, governments and central banks do not want to create expectations
that they will bail out firms that get in distress. Such expectations could lead to
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moral hazard behavior, in the form of low managerial effort, excessive risk-taking or
the choice of highly correlated strategies (cf. Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007, Farhi and
Tirole, 2012, Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 2014, Chari and Kehoe, 2013). Once firms
are in distress, however, negative external effects of firm closures or gains from rescuing
illiquid but solvent firms can make bailouts attractive from a welfare perspective. In
consequence, a commitment to a non-bailout policy may not be credible.
In this paper, we obtain the reverse. Raising bailout expectations is welfare-optimal
because it deters predatory short selling; the eventual bailout reduces welfare because
there are no externalities in our model, and distressed firms in equilibrium are always of
bad type and insolvent. The latter also modifies Bagehot’s dictum that only insolvent
firms should not be bailed out. We obtain that they should, even though it appears to
be inefficient ex post. In the literature on bailouts, Cordella and Yeyati (2003) is the
only paper that arrives at a similar conclusion. In their model, bailout expectations
increase the charter value of banks, which counterbalances the effects of risk-taking
incentives.
4.3 Using noisy information about the firm’s type
When the government can perform an investigation about the firm’s type and receive
a private signal, it is no longer optimal to perform bailouts randomly. Assume the
government observes a noisy signal y ∈ R about the firm’s type with density function
f(y|θ). We assume that higher values of y are more likely for a good type, formally
the likelihood ratio f(y|θ = g)/f(y|θ = b) shall be strictly increasing in y. It is then
preferable from an ex-post perspective to perform bailouts after a high signal rather
than after a low signal. Furthermore, higher signals are more likely after a predatory
short sale (after which the firm may be a good or bad type) than after an informed short
sale (after which the firm is always a bad type). This means a policy that performs
bailouts after sufficiently high signals is also better able to deter predatory short sales
ex ante than a random bailout policy. We summarize this result in
Proposition 6. If the government receives a continuously distributed private noisy
signal y, with larger signals being more likely for good firms, a policy of random bailouts
is dominated by a policy to perform a bailout if and only if y ≥ y¯ for some cut-off level
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y¯.
Proof. Straightforward, see discussion above.
This result is more in line with Bagehot’s dictum to only bail out solvent firms.
4.4 Short sales ban
Finally, we compare a short sale ban with bailouts in our model. A short sale ban means
that the strategic trader has only the option to buy shares or to perform no trade. As
in our basic model, it is optimal to buy shares if and only if the trader is informed
about a good firm type. Given that no stock trades are observed under a short sale
ban, passive financial investors’ rational belief about the firm’s success probability is
given by
σ˜0 =
η(1− γ)σb + (1− η)σu
η(1− γ) + (1− η) . (39)
If σ˜0v > L, a short sale ban causes the project to be always refinanced no matter
whether the strategic trader buys stocks or not. The short sale ban then yields the same
total welfare as a bailout policy with a 100% bailout probability. The total welfare is
thus strictly lower than under a bailout policy with the bailout probability β¯ < 1 that
suffices to completely deter predatory short sales.
If σ˜0v < L, passive investors prefer to liquidate the project if they do not observe
that the strategic trader has bought stocks. Intuitively, the absence of good news from
the stock market is now interpreted as sufficiently bad news about the firm’s type to
trigger liquidation. Hence, the short sale ban leads to the same outcome as if in the
basic model without bailouts: an uninformed strategic trader always performs predatory
short sales. This means in the case q¯ < 1, the short sale ban, somewhat paradoxically,
even increases the frequency of liquidations and reduces the total welfare compared to
the baseline case with short sales and without bailouts. If q¯ = 1 the short sale ban
leads to exactly the same outcome as in the basic model without bailouts.
Overall, an optimal bailout policy dominates short sale bans because it allows to
selectively reduce predatory short sales while keeping informed short sellers in the mar-
ket.
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5 Conclusion
This paper extends the literature on predatory short selling and bailouts through a
joint analysis of the two. We obtain several novel results: Bailing out insolvent firms
can increase welfare because it makes uninformed short selling less attractive. Bailouts
can thus be optimal ex ante but undesirable ex post. This complements the literature,
which focuses on dealing with undesirable ex-ante effects (e.g. Farhi and Tirole 2012,
Bernardo, Talley and Welch, 2014, Chari and Kehoe, 2013). Second, in our model
bailouts are a better policy tool than short selling restrictions. This augments theoreti-
cal results on the optimality of short sale restrictions obtained by Goldstein and Gu¨mbel
(2008), Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2014) and Liu (2010). Finally, welfare gains are
unevenly distributed: shareholders gain while taxpayers lose, which contributes to the
debate over the redistribution effects of bailouts (e.g. Acharya et al. 2011).
To focus our analysis, we have abstracted from externalities of bailouts and from the
fact that bailouts can induce moral hazard in form of excessive risk taking. Modeling
these important factors can clearly modify the overall assessment of bailouts. Bailouts
can turn out to be unattractive if the net effect of externalities and moral hazard is
negative and stronger than the positive effect obtained in our model. On the other
hand, the new effects that we find should continue to be present. Hence, our analysis
does not yield a policy recommendation for governments to perform bailouts, but simply
highlights one positive effect of bailouts that has not yet been discussed in the literature.
Empirically, predatory short sales appear to be a rare animal that is difficult to spot.
While some market participants claim their existence7 the literature does not provide
clear positive evidence on the prevalence of manipulative short selling and its effects (e.g
Karpoff and Lou, 2010, Shkilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2012, and Boehmer and Wu,
2013). The lack of empirical evidence could be due to the difficulty of distinguishing
informed short sellers from uninformed ones. On the other hand, it is also consistent
with our results. In our model, predatory short sales are potentially profitable but
become less so in the presence of bailouts; for some parameters, the optimal bailout
policy completely deters predatory short sales.
7Examples are statements by the monoline insurer MBIA (2008) or Morgan Stanley CEO John
Mack (Thornton, 2008).
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Of course, another explanation for the empirical observations is that, contrary to
what we and others assume in our models, market conditions are generally such that
predatory short selling is not profitable. Even if this were true, our findings would
contribute to the policy debate. Governments and regulators continue to implement
or consider short selling restrictions.8 Our model shows that such restrictions are not
necessarily the best instrument for combating negative effects of short selling, even if
one does not doubt that short selling can have such effects.
8A recent example is a restriction of short selling activity in shares of two Italian banks, which was
approved by the European regulator ESMA in November 2014 (ESMA, 2014).
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Appendix
Overview of variables used and their definition:
Variable Definition
ti time , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
θ firm type, θ ∈ {g(ood), b(ad)}
γ probability for a good firm type, Pr(θ = g) = γ
σθ success probability of the firm’s investment with σg > σb
σu expected success probability if type is unknown, σu = γσg + (1− γ)σb
v firm’s value in the case of success, zero otherwise
∆ debt that must be repaid (incl. interest) at t2
L liquidation value in t2
i interest rate of newly issued debt
η revelation probability of firm’s type to the strategic trader at t1
τ strategic trader’s strategy τ ∈ {s(hort), 0, `(ong)}
σ˜(τ) competitive investors’ belief at t2 about the success probability of the firm’s project
pt stock price at time t ∈ {1, 2, 3}
α strategic trader’s order management ability α ∈ (0, 1/2)
pτ price the strategic traders pays / receives given her strategy pτ = αp1 + (1− α)p2
λθ equilibrium probability with which a firm of type θ will be liquidated
q probability for a short sale by an uninformed trader
q¯ critical value for which it will be profitable to liquidate after observing short sales
β probability of a bailout after short sale, β ∈ [0, 1]
β¯ bailout probability above which predatory short sales are deterred
i∗ bailout loan rate, set such that shareholders are indifferent
between refinancing and liquidating
W d expected welfare under bailout prob. β¯ that deters predatory short sales
W 0 expected welfare under a bailout probability of 0
y government’s noisy signal about the firm’s type with density f(y ∈ R|θ) (Section 4.2)
σ˜0 passive investor’s belief about firm’s success probability
under short sale ban if no trades are observed
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